“Prohibiting religious signs in the name of secularism is absurd”

In a context of recurrent controversies about Islam, often confused with its only rigorous currents, even with Islamist terrorism, two law proposals focused on the general ban on religious signs were submitted in the Senate and the Assembly . The first (soon examined in the Senate) fixes prohibitions which are already possible; The two (including one co-signed by a minister) generalize a prohibition even if it means opposing secularism itself, to feed what they claim to fight and to open the door to liberticidal drifts in other areas.

Anything that objectively disturbs a sporting practice can already be prohibited. Going beyond is to prefer subjectivity and pave the way for the legalization of discrimination.

Already, public sports equipment cannot be used as a prayer room, since it cannot have a cult destination, the administration being separated from cults. Then, municipalities can already prohibit any jersey in their swimming pools which poses a problem of hygiene, safety or public order. On these criteria, the burkini as a too large jersey is already there, with some exceptions, prohibited.

On the other hand, a ban in the name of secularism is absurd. Because secularism only supposes neutrality of those who represent public administration, to guarantee equality of service for all, whatever their convictions. As for the law of 2004, let us specify that it subjects the students of the public to a strong discretion because of their young age and the need for learning the basics of knowledge without excessive influence, so that they can freely develop their Critical spirit. Expanding this law to adults therefore reveals the ignorance of it.

Prohibitions according to sports

Regarding sports competitions, any sportsman selected in a French team is already subject to the principle of neutrality. Indeed, the Council of State clarified in 2023 that the neutrality of the public service applies to persons selected by the sports federations, since the latter are delegates of a public service and therefore represent the administration. As early as 2015, the Observatory of Secularism had advanced this rule.

As for other sportsmen and competitions, there may already be a ban on signs, if it is objectively based on the regulatory holding of the sport in question, respecting the rules of the game, on hygiene and safety and on the need to ensure the smooth running of meetings. In no case on secularism (which the Council of State recalled).

Indeed, what applies to athletes selected in a national team is not worth for those of private professional clubs, since they are legally linked to a delegated federation of a public service (even if they are dismissed) and do not therefore do not represent the administration but a private club. The de facto neutrality which already exists for certain athletes in competitions does not result from secularism but from respect for public order, the rules of the game and technical regulations, in particular respect for the dress essential to the practice of A discipline.

This is how the Council of State admitted that the French Football Federation can restrict the wearing of religious signs in football competitions. Thus, if wearing a hijab can be prohibited for security reasons (for example, it may be dangerous to be grabbed at the level of a veil in action), on the other hand, it is difficult to see how could be justified The prohibition on sportsmen, as part of private clubs in competition, to carry a headgear accessory which would comply with the regulatory hold (and which can already carry men), without discomfort caused on the smooth running of the Meeting and without questioning the safety of sports.

A general and absolute ban

These law proposals are therefore contrary to secularism when they impose a general and absolute prohibition, in fact, of any accessory visible to any believing sportsman, for any competition.

While these proposals specify in their presentation reasons wanting to fight against “Communitarian drifts”they promote them. On the one hand, by moving sportsmen and sports people to community structures and meetings where an accessory could be worn responding to their religious practice; on the other hand, by offering the argument of discrimination to radical indoctrinkers (“You see, we refuse you access to sport without reason!” »»). Faced with the counterproductive ban, it would be much more effective to mix sports audiences instead of locking them up in their neighborhood.

In a state of law, we do not prohibit everything that can displease individually, even if we can debate it on the ground of ideas, with the concerned. In a state of law, one generally prohibits in general what disturbs public order.