“The state, although secular, wants to produce a tailor -made Islam”

The cross: the Minister of the Interior, Bruno Retailleau, received for the first time members of the forum of Islam of France (FORIF) Tuesday February 4. What can we expect from the resumption of the file of the organization of Islam in France?

Franck Frégosi: The question will be whether Mr. Retailleau will formalize the FOIF as the official body representing Islam of France or if it will leave it in its current form, that is to say a platform for exchange on the Muslim cult with actors of territorial Islam. When it was created in 2022, the Forer was absolutely not presented as an organ representing worship.

But before Gérald Darmanin left the Ministry of the Interior, he announced in February 2024 his wish that the Forif became a “Federation” of Islam of France. The ministry had no doubt realized that the FORIF was not a bad initiative but that it was also necessary a structure invested with a form of legitimacy to speak in the name of Islam.

In your work, you explain that, since the 1990s, the organization of Islam has been characterized by the will of the public authorities to find “partners”. What do you mean by that?

FF: Since 1990, the public authorities have been in a logic of “partnership” in their relationship with Muslim worship. This had started with the Corif (guidance and reflection council on Islam in France) in 1990, and it became even more manifest with the “consultation” of Jean-Pierre Chevènement in 1999. Some ministers had then understood that it was good to reflect the diversity of the sensitivities of Islam in France without interfering in doctrinal quarrels.

This partnership led to the creation of the French Council for Muslim worship in 2003, which had the merit of symbolizing the representation of Islam at the national level, with relays in the regions, CRCM. The public authorities then joined forces with mosque rectors and federation officials.

However, this device turned out to be extremely heavy: those responsible, torn in particular by their links with certain Muslim states, had difficulty making decisions independently. Gérald Darmanin decided to stop there in 2021 to create a more flexible platform, the Forif.

In doing so, he apparently abandoned pyramid logic to give voice to players in the field, from the territories. This device could have suggested that the organization left the base, except that the Forer is still very controlled by the State since its members are appointed by the public authorities.

You title your book “Governing Islam”, arguing that the interventionism of the public authorities with regard to the organization of Muslim worship is like a form of “domestication”. That’s to say ?

FF: The various attempts to organize Muslim worship reflect the will of the State to provide Islam with a mode of organization supposed to be compatible with the Republic. It is also a question of regulating the word of Islam in a context of more and more assertive secularism, or even of encouraging Muslims to reform their understanding of their religion. The notion of “domestication” refers to a state which, rightly or wrongly, tries to set up a tailor -made Islam, an almost docile Islam.

The famous laws on the veil – first the law of 2004 on the veil in school, then the law of 2010 on the full veil – are an illustration, like the discourse of the Mureaux where Emmanuel Macron wished the emergence of a “ISlam of the Enlightenment”. These orientations show that the public power – although secular – wants to manage a room for maneuver in order to produce an Islam which does not detonate too much compared to a set of values ​​presented as principles in the Republic.

However, one can be surprised by such an orientation on the part of a secular state: the state has no more to preach consciences than to define what should be the norm in matters of Islam. On the other hand, it is up to Muslims to seize this question and to open different sites.

This management is therefore paradoxical in more ways than one: on the one hand, we proclaim the religious neutrality of the State, and at the same time the public authorities consider that they are founded to impose on Muslim worship more constraints than to others.

Why do the public authorities show more assertive voluntarism in the governance of Islam than in that of other cults?

FF: Islam is a religion which has certainly become endogenous, but which, rightly or wrongly, and in particular since the attacks, is perceived by some as having subversive potential. In recent years, a reading grid has imposed itself, which tends to establish – wrongly in my opinion – continuums between ordinary forms of Islam and more maximalist, political or violent Islamic expressions.

According to the public authorities, this justifies to be more vigilant and to control more cult. I believe that the attacks are certainly to be taken into account, but without considering that the most pious ordinary Muslims are surety.

We have also inherited from the colonial period the idea that Islam should be reformed from above. Finally, it is true that Islam does not enjoy a centralized organization like other cults: there has never been an organ recognized enough to represent Muslim worship. However, the public authorities need to have an interlocutor.

What lines of organization of Islam do you sketch?

FF: It is necessary to salute the fact that the FOIF gives the floor to Islam of the territories, but I think that an organization of worship at the national level would be desirable. Why not solicit the basic faithful in this site, as well as the imams? This would break the idea that these instances are devoid of legitimacy. I believe that it would be more judicious to associate the faithful, but also the imams, since it is a question of deciding on their preaching, their status and their training. Often these devices talk about them without giving them the floor.